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Abstract
We introduce Unity, a new consensus algorithm for public blockchain settings. Unity is an
eventual consistency protocol merging the Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
into a coherent stochastic process. It encompasses hardware and economic security without
sacrificing availability, unpredictability and decentralization. Empirical results indicate that
the proposed protocol is fair and scalable to an arbitrary number of miners and stakers.
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1 Introduction
Eventual Consistency based consensus protocols have shown incredible resilience over the past
decade as it has until recent years remained a persistent standard in many popular network im-
plementations. As explored by Miller and La Viola [MLJ14], PoW consensus (a.k.a. Nakamoto
consensus) protocols adhere well in public settings. These protocols expose no message com-
plexity to limit the size of the network, nor do they expose any interactive membership system
to constrain the validator set. Instead, PoW offers a non-interactive puzzle based purely on the
computational power of all participants in the network. Therefore the security of the network
depends mostly on the relative computational power of the malicious party.
While these protocols do provide consensus, they don’t necessarily provide immutability as by
their very nature they are designed to reach consensus that favours the total work done by parties
in the network. One flaw in the system as a whole is the expected distribution of computation
resources within the network. Whereas it was initially assumed to be a flat, mostly uniform
distribution, the rise of mining pools [Ali18] and ASICs [Mon19] leave many initial assumptions
of resource breakdown mostly obsolete. In recent years it has become apparent that the disparity
in computational resources between larger and smaller networks and the increasing efficiency of
resource renting services revokes previous assumptions of the impracticality of a double-spend
attack in smaller networks [Sin18].
An alternative approach known as Proof-of-Stake (PoS) encompasses a broad spectrum of con-
sensus protocols that share the common attribute in utilizing the stake a user has in a network
[BGM14]. Proponents here argue that utilizing stake has the inherent benefit of better aligning
the incentives of the user and network, as well as providing a protocol designer more flexibility in
punishing behaviour not intended by the protocol (slashing) [Etha]. Pure PoS also suffers from
criticisms. Specifically, it changes the security model to be based economic activities, introducing
the possibility of coin swing attacks and increasing the feasibility for plutocracy and collusion
[But18].
In this paper, we propose a novel consensus protocol, Unity, which merges pure PoW and PoS
into a coherent stochastic process, which demonstrates the highest level of security and strongest
resilience to economic exploits.
1.1 Contributions
This document will present:
• A novel hybrid consensus protocol called Unity that retains the non-interactivity originally
obtained from Nakamoto consensus and places little restrictions on the network size.
• Results from simulations at varying degrees of details, providing an argument for the long
term sustainability and coherence of such a protocol.
2 Related Works
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) algorithms first appeared as little more than a thought experiment on the
Bitcoin Forum [Qua11]. The work of Popov [Pop16] demonstrated the ability to formulate a
pseudo-random deterministic ordered list, and the demonstration that such a mechanism could
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be used to effectively simulate a stochastic process similar to that of PoW. Of great interest to this
paper is the fact that the exact order of the list is not known unless all players choose to publish
their respective ranks. Working off several previous designs, Jepson [Jep15] demonstrated the
ability to mitigate private mining by forcing increasingly expensive PoW mining via modifications
to the fork choice rule to account for the stake within the network.
3 Preliminaries
Assume the existence of a network of interconnected nodes. Each node maintains a state δ that
contains a tree of homogeneous blocks, and that blocks are linked through hashes. Define Nx
the set of all non-negative integers smaller than 2x. Define a block b = (fp, fsr, ftr, fd, fts, ftx),
where fp, fsr, ftr, fd ∈ N256, fts ∈ N64, ftx is a list. The exact purpose of each element is defined
in table 1.
Element Description
fp The hash of the parent block.
fsr The hash of the root node of the state trie, after all transac-
tions are executed and finalisations applied.
ftr The hash of the root node of the trie structure populated with
each transaction in the transactions list portion of the block.
fd The mining and/or staking difficulty.
ftx The included transactions.
fts The timestamp of the block generation.
Table 1: The basic elements of a block
There exists a set of users that are participating on the network. Refer to this as the universe
of the blockchain and denote the set of all users by ξ = {x | x ∈ N0 ∧ x ≤ 2256}, where x
represents a unique ID corresponding to the account. Assume then there are two other sets
H and B that refer to the active computational power, and balance of the user. There exists
fhp : ξ 7−→ H, fbalance : ξ 7−→ B, now define the set M = {µ ∈ ξ | fhp(µ) 6= 0}, as the set
of active miners, and define S = {s ∈ ξ | fbalance(s) 6= 0}, these form the two main parties of
interest in the system. S represents all actively participating stakers (implicit, that all users
with balance are participating, this can be mapped onto scenarios where only a proportion of
the network is participating in staking, see [Pop16]).
A transaction represents a valid arc between two states, formally:
δt+1 ≡ Υ(δt, T ),
where Υ is the state transition function and T is a transaction. Υ can be as simple as a balance
transfer function or more powerful to include arbitrary state transactions through a virtual
machine.
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4 Unity - A Hybrid PoW/PoS Consensus
The design of Unity is relatively (and deliberately) simple. The design is such that there are
two relatively independent stochastic processes. Here the novelty is mainly in that the security
of the system relies both on computational resources and active stake of the network. The game
being played is similar to that of PoW: all active miners (who produce PoW blocks) and stakers
(who produce PoS) blocks compete in two separate lotteries respectively. The first to find a
new block publishes and obtains rewards for doing so. We define a fork selection rule based
on an intermediate unit that incorporates both total computational resources and total active
stake.
Also similar to PoW is a network parameter, defined beforehand, and two separate difficulty
parameters (for PoW and PoS) that fluctuate (see section 4.2), to maintain the parameter.
The protocols assumes that honest nodes in the network will always mine on the heaviest known
chain. In the standard case the first to publish a new block has the highest chance of being
included into the main chain, as it is most likely to be seen by the majority of nodes in the
network. It is also obvious to see that the two stochastic processes must appear to be i.i.d,
otherwise we could not assume the behaviour of honest nodes to be optimal (for example imagine
if the PoS process was not memoryless, this would drastically change the behaviour of the game).
A simple depiction of a main chain and a fork is shown in fig. 1.
The next few sections provides details on the block forging processes for participants, and makes
an argument via simulation for why they can be treated as i.i.d.
A (0, 1) B (0, 2) C (1, 2) D (2, 2) E (2, 3) F (2, 4)
G (1, 3) H (2,3)
Figure 1: A depiction of a Unity chain, note that there is no enforced pattern or ordering on
PoW blocks (Square) and PoS blocks (Circle). Note that (tdw, tds) represents the total mining
and staking difficulty respectively. In this scenario, the bold arrows represent the canonical
chain. As explained later in section 4.3, this is due to have a higher combined total difficulty of
td = tdw · tds = 2 · 4 = 8 vs 6.
4.1 Block Forging
In this setup, miners working on a PoW will operate in a similar fashion to a conventional
mining setup, where a naive (but concise) implementation would have the miner performing the
following steps as shown in algorithm 1; one can see that the game being played is still the same.
Assume the mining difficulty parameter dw and the existence of a 256-bit hash function hash(·),
the miners solve the following cryptographic puzzle:
hit = hash(b) ≤ 2256/dw. (1)
Treat hash(·) as a random oracle with uniform distribution in N256. There is some reward
that is distributed to the miners for successfully mining a block. As the cryptographic puzzle
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is independent of the miner, the probability of a miner mining a block is proportional to the
number of permutations a user can to evaluate, its computational power.
Algorithm 1 Correct Mining Loop, with memory pool (pending state), and a difficulty adjust-
ment function.
1: procedure MINEBLOCK(δ) . The mining loop
2: c← GetBestChain
3: b1 ← GetLastPowBlock(c)
4: b2 ← GetSecondLastPowBlock(c)
5: diff ← GetDifficulty(b1, b2)
6: txs← GetMemPoolTxs()
7: b← CreatePowBlockTemplate(c, txs)
8: do
9: solution← PoW(b)
10: while solution > 2256/diff
11: b← Finalize(b, solution)
12: ImportAndPropagate(b)
13: end procedure
This is in contrast to block forging in a PoS setup, in which we derive a mostly non-interactive
forging protocol first formally proposed by Popov [Pop16], and later expanded upon by Begichava
and Kofman [BK18] to provide fair distribution. The proposed PoS forging algorithm here follows
close to [BK18], and simulations show the distribution to be fair relative to staking power. More
importantly, this implementation is not the transparent forging scheme described in later versions
of [Pop16]. Thus, it preserves the nice characteristic of not revealing the rank ordering of the
list for any party unless the party chooses to submit a block.
In the PoS forging described in algorithm 2, every staker computes a deterministic pseudo-random
number, seed, using its public-private key pair (pk, sk),
seedt+1 = sign(seedt, sk). (2)
For the given staker, a PoS block can be produced if and only if
| ln(hash(seed)/2256)| · ds ≤ V ·∆, (3)
where V is the amount of stake (or voting power) and ∆ is the time elapsed since the last PoS
block. The ∆ can also be computed by solving
∆ ≥ ds · ln(hash(seed)/2
256)
V
. (4)
4.1.1 Voting Power and Active Stake
Voting power V is the active stake for a particular account. The balance of every account is
initially unstaked, and therefore does not contribute to V . The user must called the lock()
function to lock balance. There is then a cycle of maturation that occurs before locked stake
becomes active. Note that the concept of maturity is boolean, the locked coins are either matured
(in which case they are active stake) or not (see fig. 2). This is to prevent any staking grinding
attacks (see section 5.4) and balance shifting attacks [nxt]. The withdrawal period lock-up is to
facilitate a possible slashing mechanism (see Appendix B).
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Algorithm 2 Correct Staking Forge Loop, here V refers to the voting power of the account, φ
refers to the current timestamp of the forger.
1: procedure FORGEBLOCK(δ, pk, sk)
2: c← GetBestChain
3: b1 ← GetLastPosBlock(c)
4: b2 ← GetSecondLastPosBlock(c)
5: stake← GetStake(c, pk)
6: diff ← GetDifficulty(b1, b2)
7: ts← GetTimestamp(b1)
8: seed← GetSeed(b1)
9: seed← Sign(seed, sk)
10: ∆← diff · ln(hash(seed)/2256)/stake
11: do
12: Sleep(1)
13: while φ < ts+ ∆
14: txs← GetMemPoolTxs()
15: b← CreatePosBlockTemplate(c, txs, seed)
16: b← Finalize(b, sk)
17: ImportAndPropagate(b)
18: end procedure
4.2 Difficulty Adjustment
As discussed in [Gro15], both PoW and PoS block generation time is distributed exponentially. In
case of PoW, the rate λw is equal to r/dw, where r is the hash rate and dw is the mining difficulty;
in PoS, the rate λs is equal to b/ds, where b is the stake and ds is the staking difficulty.
The goal of difficulty adjustment algorithm is to achieve a mean target block time of t. For a
random variable X ∼ Exp(λ), the mean is λ−1. Let λ−1w = 2t and λ−1s = 2t, then dw = r · 2t
and ds = b · 2t. However, the network hash rate can not be determined by the protocol and
changes frequently as miners come and go; the network stake can be calculated but the active
stake is unknown due to some of the nodes being offline. Therefore, the difficulties can only be
learned.
Ideally, a difficulty adjustment algorithm should have the following common properties:
• Responsiveness – The algorithm should respond quickly to changes in the network hash
rate or stake power.
• Low volatility – The difficulty should be relatively stable when the network hash rate or
stake power is constant.
• Simplicity – The algorithm should be relatively simple to implement.
• Low memory – The algorithm should not require a memory of many past block times-
tamps.
In Unity, a new algorithm is proposed. Let 2t be the target time (between PoW blocks and
between PoS blocks), the algorithm works in the following way:
• d := 1;
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unstaked transfer()
pre-active period
lock() withdraw()
t < T
active stake
t >= T
post-active period
withdraw()
t >= W
t < W
Figure 2: Possible states for coins in an account. Where T refers to a constant specifying the
time (in height) it takes for stake to become active. W refers to a constant specifying the time
it takes for stake to become unlocked.
• let X be an exponential random variable with rate λ = 12t ;
• if X > − ln(0.5)λ , then dt+1 = dt1+α ;
• if X = − ln(0.5)λ , then dt+1 = dt;
• if X < − ln(0.5)λ , then dt+1 = dt · (1 + α).
The α controls the learning rate, which further determines the responsiveness of the algorithm.
The − ln(0.5)λ is calculated by solving the following equation,
1− e(−λx) = 0.5, (5)
where the left-hand side is the cumulative distribution function of an exponential random vari-
able.
Note that the difficulty adjustment algorithm is primarily based on block timestamp. The honest
nodes are required to not process a future block. See more detailed analysis in section A.
4.3 Fork Choice Rule
The Unity fork choice rule is based on the product of total mining difficulty tdw and total staking
difficulty tds,
c0 = arg max
i∈{1,...,N}
tdwi · tdsi, (6)
where c0 is the canonical chain and N is total number of forks.
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4.4 Preservation of Nakamoto Consensus Traits
Many of the common proofs of effectiveness of Nakamoto Consensus have relied on the treatment
of the stochastic process as a Poisson process. Nakamoto’s initial introduction of Bitcoin [Nak08]
assumes this when calculating the feasiility of an attack, and Eyal and Sirer make the same
assumption in derivations of the selfish mining attack [ES18]. Both the traditional PoW and
PoS mechanisms described in Unity adhere to these principles, therefore assuming that both
mechanisms are i.i.d (which the difficulty function should provide) we can argue that:
P (Z) =
(λx + λy)
z
z!
e−(λx+λy) (7)
Follow the proof in [PN16]. Let Nx(t) and Ny(t) be two independent Poisson processes with
rates λx and λy respectively. Let us define N(t) = Nx(t) + Ny(t). That is, the random process
N(t) is obtained by combining the arrivals in Nx(t) and Ny(t). First, note that
N(0) = Nx(0) +Ny(0) = 0 + 0 = 0. (8)
Now, consider an interval of length pi, i.e, I = (t, t+ pi]. The numbers of arrivals in I associated
with Nx(t) and Ny(t) are Poisson(λxpi) and Poisson(λypi) and they are independent. Therefore,
the number of arrivals in I associated with N(t) is Poisson((λx + λy)pi).
A well known property which states that the summation of two Poisson RVs is another Poisson
RV in which the rate is the summation of the two. The simulations show that this result is
indeed correct, as λPoS,PoW = λ/2. Therefore the target rate as we expected was λPoS,PoW ·2 =
λ.
4.5 Slashing
Whether slashing should be enforced is left to the implementation. For an analysis over different
slashing protocols, see Appendix B.
5 Security Analysis
We examine attacks published in past literature [But][KRDO16].
5.1 Private Double-spend Attack
Conventional Nakamoto consensus is subject to double-spend attacks, because transactions are
irreversible and forks are allowed. For instance, in Bitcoin, if an attacker controls 51% of the
total hash power, he can produce a side chain with a higher total difficulty than the current
main chain. After a spending transaction has been acknowledge by a merchant or exchange, the
attacker can release a side chain to reverse that transaction. Similarly, an attacker can launch a
double-spend attack if he controls over 51% of the total stake, for a pure PoS network.
In Unity, it is much more difficult for an attacker with 51% hash power or 51% stake power
to launch a similar attack, because the fork choice rule takes both mining and staking into
9
account. It would require a combination of hash and stake power of over 100% to dominate the
system.
The fork choice rule also implies that one’s power is maximized only when he possesses close
mining power and staking power. Unity’s hybrid consensus balances the power between mining
giants and big coin holders in such a way that not a single part can harm the security of the
system. Additionally one could argue that the incentives for launching this attack as a stake,
and thus coin holder becomes less plausible as the net drop in price due to fallout impacts all
coin holders negatively.
5.1.1 Calculations
Consider the scenario where an attacker tries to generate an alternative chain in private, and
reveal it at a later point. Assume the attacker has a hash power and stake power (a, b); and the
honest nodes has (c, d).
Based on the analysis in [Gro15], the PoW block generation rate λw =
w
dw
, where w is the hash
rate. In a period of unit time, the number of blocks will be produced is a random variable
X ∼ Pois(λw), and E(X) = λw. Let Yw be the total mining difficulty, then E(Yw) = E(X)∗dw.
Thus,
E(Yw) =
w
dw
∗ dw = w.
Similarly, the PoS block generation rate λw =
s
ds
, where s is the stake. Let Ys be the total
mining difficulty, then
E(Ys) =
w
ds
∗ ds = s.
Thus, the total mining difficulty is an integration of hash rate over time, while the total staking
difficulty is an integration of stake over time. Given a time duration t, the attacker’s chain has
an expected weight of
(tdwc + a · t) · (tdsc + b · t)
and the honest nodes’ chain has
(tdwc + c · t) · (tdsc + d · t),
where tdw and tds are the total mining difficulty and total staking difficulty from the genesis
block to the fork point.
For the attacker to overthrow the honest nodes’ chain, the attacker’s chain has to own a higher
weight than the honest nodes’ chain, which further leads to the following inequality:
tdsc · (a− c) + tdwc · (b− d) + (ab− cd) · t ≥ 0. (9)
5.2 Nothing-At-Stake
Nothing-At-Stake is a well known issue of PoS blockchains where staking has literally no cost.
Coin holders can stake on every branch they see to maximize their profits no matter which branch
wins the fork competition. This harms the system in a way that forks may be maintained for
a long time (the finality is delayed) and, attackers only need 1% stake power to select a winner
fork to conduct double-spending.
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Some solutions try to punish accounts who staked on multiple branches but a strategy called
undetectable nothing-at-stake[BCNPW18] allows attackers to enact this without leaving hard
evidence. This attack amounts to splitting stake into multiple accounts, the net probability of
the set being validated remaining the same. No punishment can be enacted on the attacker in
this scheme as it is impossible to prove (from the information observed by the network) two
accounts are owned by the same individual.
Unity doesn’t suffer from this problem thanks to its hybrid nature: Forks can be efficiently
eliminated by PoW mining as miners will eventually concentrate on one fork just like in pure
PoW systems.
5.3 Long Range Attack
Long Range Attacks (LRAs) refer to a scenario where the attacker reverts to a depth significantly
distant (in the past) from the current time, in which the individual has compromised > 50% of
staking power in the network. This attack is only feasible when the creation of blocks is free,
therefore assume that an attacker will try to launch this attack with only PoS blocks. Then, one
can argue that,
tda =
∑
i=1..Hw−n
dwi ·
∑
j=1...Hs
dsj
= ((Hw − n) · dw) · (Hs · ds)
(10)
Where tda represents the total difficulty of the attackers chain. It is trivial to see that even if the
attacker were to own all of the active stake, assuming the total voting power does not change,
the best case is an equal td to the main chain. Because the protocol disallows future blocks, the
expected upper bound blocks being forged by the LRA is (φ− tNw−n)/2t. If the attacker is able
to grow his staking power through block rewards, the chance of success if maximized the earlier
the point of attack. The attacker would require
(Hs · (ds + Ω)) > (Hw · dw) · (Hs · ds)
Ω >
Hw · dw
Hs
(11)
Assuming that the main chain has static forging power (difficulty does not change), we expect
Nw = Ns, we define a parameter Ω to represent the additional amount of power (represented in
difficulty) an attacker would require to match the main chain. From eq. (11), Ω must be greater
than the difficulty of the PoW chain. Further exploration is needed on the time it takes for an
attacker to achieve the additional difficulty, the hypothesis is that this process of acquiring power
gradually via block rewards occurs over a long period of time.
5.3.1 Past Majority Attack
In one scenario, the attackers are validators who in the past held majority. In a pure PoS
setting these types of attacks require the existence of assisted synchronization to ensure that a
11
user who is excessively desynchronized from the network obtains correct information. However
section 5.3 and this section indicate that Unity works even in the absence of this party, as the
hybrid approach ensures the creation of a pure PoS fork is impractical.
5.4 Stake Grinding
Stake grinding is a form of attack where the attacker obtains some control over the generation
of a seed and is able to grind solutions (in a fashion similar to PoW) until the seed determines a
series of random numbers favourable for the attacker as examined by Buterin[But]. An obvious
example of this is obtaining a seed that allows the attacker to generate the majority of blocks
for the next n blocks in a sequence.
The attacker must have a variable to grind. In this design, the block hash is not a viable source
for this, as the previous seed is directly related to the unique signature of the last staker. One
possible avenue of grinding could be to distribute PoS to a large amount of accounts where the
signatures of each account (assuming this occurs in a sequence) leads to a high probability of
another being selected. To combat the protocol specifically requires a maturing period. Therefore
any information the attacker has in the present (or near present) has no effect assuming that
this delay is set properly.
5.5 Denial of Service
Denial of Service attacks occur when an attacker is aware of who will be engaging in block
production a priori to the event. This allows the attacker to identify the physical location of the
block producer and remove the node via DOS. Unity doesn’t suffer (assuming a fairly distributed
voting set) to this problem as validators are randomly selected in both PoW and PoS, and no
information about block production eligibility is leaked until the blocks are published.
5.6 Selfish Mining
Selfish mining refers to a scenario where attackers try to mine more blocks than their hash power
deserves to with a strategy that: If the attackers mined block B1, they don’t publish it so that
they can start mining the next block B2 earlier than other miners in the network. But they
also take risks as other miner may create and publish another B′1 at any time and run ahead of
attackers’ hidden B1.
Selfish mining is more powerful if one can predict when others can mine a block so that the risk
of holding a mined block is reduced. Unity doesn’t suffer from this problem as block creation
is random in both PoW and PoS, and no information about it is leaked until the blocks are
published.
Unity’s hybrid consensus makes selfish mining impractical as attackers may miss a PoS block
when holding a mined PoW block.
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5.7 Transaction Denial
Transaction denial attacks are a censorship attack where the attacker wants to prevent a trans-
action from being confirmed. By section 4.3, the leader is randomly selected via a lottery, and
therefore randomly selects a block proposer. Therefore as long as the transaction is propagated
to the majority of mining nodes it cannot be denied.
5.8 Eclipse Attack
Eclipse attacks define when a nodes view of the network is compromised via receiving only
incorrect information from it is peers. In our setup a node in this position would be assumed to
be an attacker.
6 Results
In this section, empirical evaluation results from simulation are presented. For simplicity, we
simulate the hash output as a uniformly distributed variable X ∼ U(0, 1), for both miners and
stakers. For the difficulty adjustment algorithm, we set α = 0.01. Additionally, we have S =
[160, 80, 40, 30, 20, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] and M = [16, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]; the numbers are picked to
demonstrate how different measurements respond to both linear and exponential increases in
hash/stake power. The target block time t is 10 seconds, and a period of 30 days is simulated.
For anyone who is interested, the full simulation code is available at https://github.com/
aionnetwork/unity/blob/master/simulations/unity_poisson_sim/Unity.ipynb.
6.1 Block Rewards Fairness
First, the block rewards fairness is studied. In the Unity context, fairness means that the number
of PoS blocks and the number of PoW blocks should be equal or very close. Additionally, for the
miners, the block rewards should be proportional to their hash power (normalized by the total
network hash power); for the stakers, the block rewards should be proportional to their stake
power (normalized by the total network stake).
During the simulated period, a total of 250044 blocks are generated, where 124858 of them are
PoS blocks and 125186 of them are PoW blocks. The block reward that each miner/staker
received (normalized) is depicted in fig. 3. Block rewards are observed to be proportional to the
relative stake/hash power, thus the system can be deemed fair.
6.2 Block Time Distribution
Then, we look at the block time distribution based on our simulation. As described earlier, we
want a target block time of 10 seconds, as a result of 20 second PoS block time and 20 second
PoW block time.
The block time statistics are presented in table 2 and fig. 4. The distribution of PoS/PoW/All
block time fits well the exponential distribution, as shown in fig. 4. The corresponding average
rate are
∑
s∈S s/ds,
∑
m∈M m/dm, and
∑
s∈S s/ds +
∑
m∈M m/dm.
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Figure 3: Block rewards distribution vs relative hash/stake power.
Mean Standard deviation
All blocks 10.366 10.050
PoS blocks 20.759 20.575
PoW blocks 20.705 20.420
Table 2: The mean and standard deviation of block time.
Additionally, the number of blocks being generated at each second is demonstrated in fig. 5. The
fraction of orphan blocks is approximately 4.4%. However, this assumes a perfect connection
between all miners and stakers; in reality, a higher rate is expected.
6.3 Difficulty Adjustment
For simulation purposes, we implemented a naive representation of the difficulty adjustment
algorithm. The difficulty fluctuations are depicted in fig. 6. The algorithm gradually picks up
the right mining/staking difficulty to match the current network hash/stake power, and then
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Figure 4: PoS/PoW block time distribution. The bars represent the block time density and the
line is the exponential distribution fit.
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Figure 6: The staking/mining difficulties of the first 2000 PoS/PoW blocks.
fluctuates within an acceptable range. The staking difficulty is approximately 10x the mining
difficulty, which is expected as the total stake is 10x the hash rate.
7 Conclusions And Future Work
In this article, we have presented a novel consensus protocol, named Unity, for a public blockchain
context. Unity combines two independent stochastic processes (mining and staking), into a
coherent hybrid process. The simulation result indicates that the Unity protocol is fair to both
miners and stakers. The time between consecutive PoW/PoS/All blocks follows the exponential
distribution.
Different experiments and tests will be explored further in future publications and implementa-
tions. Future work concerns deeper analysis of the system stability with more complex miner
and staker dynamics, a formal proof of the protocol over all the corner cases using game theory,
and an economic model for Unity’s implementation.
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Appendices
A Future Mining Attack
Timestamp selection is closely related to the existence of a global clock, and therefore is very
important in both types of block forging. The general rule being used today is that with some
time bound tfuture, nodes in the network following the protocol will refuse to accept or propagate
blocks they see such that tblock > φ+ tfuture.
Define α ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R as the total forging power of the network, and define β = 1−α as the total
forging power deviating from the standard strategy. Assume that the deviation of the strategy
is of the form described in algorithm 2 and algorithm 1, with the exception that when importing
blocks from other sources, remove the check for tblock ≤ φ + tfuture. Consequently, actors of
this behaviour will mine blocks with timestamps arbitrarily far into the future. However, if we
assume a simplification that difficulty algorithms adjust instantaneously to the network forging
power. Assume α > 1/2 it follows that dmain > ddeviate, therefore tdmain > tddeviate as more
blocks are mined. The conclusion is that even if deviating allows you to generate blocks faster,
the loss in total difficulty incurred ensures that by the time the main chain catches up to the
future chain (recall that expected behaviour does not allow the acceptance of blocks until it is
within a delta bound), it will have a higher total difficulty.
In the special case, assume that at time t0 when the current highest block is B0 and B0 is known
to every player we are going to introduce.
Assume there are PoS block producers Alice and Bob. Alice is eligible to produce a PoS block at
ta. Bob is eligible to produce a PoS block at tb. How ta compares to tb is unknown to all other
players. And we assume that ta is the earliest time among those who don’t publish blocks early,
and tb is the earliest time among those who publish future blocks early.
Assume there are PoW miners Charlie and David. Charlie and David are going to use different
mining strategies. To compare their strategies fairly, assume that Charlie and David both have
half the total hash power and they are very likely to produce a block at the same time (α = β).
Therefore the strategies of the 4 players look like the following:
• Alice: produce and publish her PoS block Bs1a at time ta with timestamp ta
• Bob: produce and publish his PoS block Bs1b at time t0 with future timestamp tb
• Charlie: always mine on the current highest weight block which is not from future (not
with future timestamp)
• David: always mine on the highest weight block he sees (even with future time stamp)
Game begins from t0, (EVENT 0):
• EVENT 0 t0 : Bob produces and publishes his block Bs1b with timestamp tb. Charlie
mines on B0 while David mines on Bs1b.
• EVENT 1 tx: tx < ta and tx < tb (if tx is bigger than either ta or tb, the game of future
blocks doesn’t exist anymore). Both Charlie and David produced a PoW block and a fork is
created. Charlie’s block Bw1c is with timestamp t0. David’s block Bw1d is with timestamp
tb + 1.
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Now let’s take a look at the weights of both Charlie’s and David’s chains:
• Weight of Charlie’s chain W (chainc) = W (B0) +W (Bw1c)
• Weight of David’s chain W (chaind) = W (B0) +W (Bs1b) +W (Bw1d)
It is obvious to see that at tx, W (chaind) > W (chainc) despite that chaind includes blocks
from future. Assume that Charlie does not switch to chaind because he is confident about his
strategy.
• EVENT 2 ta: Alice produces and publishes her block Bs1a with timestamp ta. Bs1a
references to the highest block Bw1c.
Note here that Bs1a cannot reference to Bw1d because Bs1a conflicts with Bs1b. The PoS block
Bs2b from the next PoS round of Bob’s block is not likely to come out before ta even tb < ta.
(We have assumed that ta is the earliest time among those who don’t publish future blocks, so
ta is quite an early time). If Charlie and David both produced another (or more) PoW blocks
before ta, it doesn’t change the weight comparison. After ta, chainc and chaind are at the same
conditions again: same block height, same hash power, same stake power (a new round of PoS
starts nearly the same time at ta and tb).
Now we take a look again at the weights of both chainc and chaind:
• W (chainc) = W (B0) +W (Bw1c) +W (Bs1a)
• W (chaind) = W (B0) +W (Bs1b) +W (Bw1d)
The conclusion of the above analysis is that: at time ta, the weight of a chain depends on the
timestamp (or the eligible time) of the PoS block but not on how early it is published. There is
no proof that Bob and David’s future block strategy is better than Alice and Charlie’s. Besides,
Alice gains more transactions fee by waiting until ta and including more transactions in her block;
Charlie can be more confident about his block as his block has an earlier timestamp.
B Slashing Mechanisms
To discourage stakers from working on multiple branches when a fork comes into existence, a
slashing mechanism can be introduced. To our best knowledge, there are two types of slashing
mechanisms: slashing with hard evidence or slashing without hard evidence.
B.1 Slashing with hard evidence
Slashing with hard evidence is to punish only when a proof can be constructed to prove that a
staker has deviated from the protocol on purpose. The rules are:
• To punish a staker who has produced more than one block for the same block number;
• To punish a staker who has produced a block on top of a chain of weight w1 with timestamp
t1, and another block on top of a chain of weight w2 with timestamp t2, where w1 >= w2
and t1 <= t2.
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B.2 Slashing without hard evidence
Slashing without hard evidence to slash any staker for producing a block on a side chain, from
the main chain, for example the Dunkle [Ethb]. It eliminates the undetectable nothing-at-stake
problem, described in [BCNPW18]. Accounts are punished on chain C for having produced
blocks on other chains. The amount of punishment S should be greater than block reward R so
that the expectation of revenues E = R− S < 0.
If we assume, under a certain network condition, the probability of accidentally producing an
orphaned block is a (0 < a < 1) and we have S = n · R. When a staker is eligible to produce
a block, his expected gain is (1 − a) · R while his expected lose is a · S. For his expected gain
to be greater than his expected lose, we have (1− a) · R > a · S ≥ n < (1− a)/a. For instance,
the current orphaned block rate of the Ethereum network is around 10.13% (866869 uncle blocks
out of 8555426 total blocks), then we have n < 8.87.
B.3 Public Double-Spend Attack
Public double-spend attack is different from the private double-spend attack, in a sense that the
attacker constructs a parallel chain in public rather than in private. In the hybrid PoW/PoS
context, an attacker with over 50% hash power builds their chain in public and wants the stakers
to work on both the main chain and his side chain (if no punishment is enforced for stakers).
The attacker’s strategy is to always publish his block after a honest miners’ block. Once his
double-spending transaction is accepted, he always publish his blocks whenever mined; with
high probability, his side chain will be the main chain eventually.
Specifically, honest miners mine a block Bwh while a malicious miner (attacker) mines a block
Bwm and publishes it after Bwh. Then Alice, the earliest eligible PoS block producer, builds a
PoS block Bpa on top of Bwh because she saw it first. Then another PoS block producer Bob
decides to build a block Bpb on top of Bwm to compete with Alice’s main chain despite that
Bob’s block weights less than Alice’s. The chain is now forked and the two forks grow in the
same pace under the control of the attackers, assuming all stakers just support both forks by
producing their PoS blocks whenever eligible. Several blocks later, when attackers are ready,
they just produce and publish a PoW block earlier than honest miners, so that attackers’ chain
becomes the main chain (with higher total weight) and honest miners will switch to it. Then,
the fork ends and attackers have successfully double spent.
The key solution is to convince stakers to not support the attacker’s chain. After the side chain
is maintained for a while, it becomes obvious to everyone in the network that, this side chain is
very likely mined by a mining group with over 50% hash power, because normally miners will
not mine on a side chain that keeps up with the main chain for so long time unless they are
attackers who are confident with their over 50% hash power.
In this situation, a slashing mechanism like Dunkle does stop stakers from supporting both
chains but it also forces stakers to make a choice between the main chain and the attacker’s
chain, because the stakers who supported the losing chain will eventually be punished. So the
question is how many stakers will be convinced, either in public or private, by attackers to switch
to attackers’ chain:
• If the majority of the stakers do care about the immutability of the network, they should
refuse to support attackers’ side chain.
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• If the majority of the stakers only care about block rewards, they should probably support
attackers’ side chain if attackers showed enough hash power strength. With the support
of the persuaded stakers, the attacker can achieve hash power + stake power > 100%.
Although this is beyond the designed protocol tolerance, such collusion should be made
difficult to take place.
Based on the above analysis, applying slashing without hard evidence could be a double-edged
sword:
• Advantage: it stops stakers from supporting both forks and increases the difficulty and
risky of collusion (it is harder for an attacker to prove their hash power in early stage of
the fork without enough support of stakers).
• Side effect: if the attacker’s chain wins (after successfully convincing stakers to collude and
a group with hash power+stake power > 100% is formed), the stake of honest stakers will
be slashed. This creates another incentive for miners and stakers to collude. Additionally,
stakers may be encouraged to join a stake pool to reduce the risk of staking on a side chain.
B.4 Alternatives to Slashing
An alternative to slashing is to delay the finality of conflicting transactions (in one branch but
not the other) at the application level. Unlike the private double-spend attack, the public attack
pattern exposes those double spending transactions to the public. Exchanges, explorers and
wallets could detect such pattern and delay the finality of such transactions.
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